Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 24 
Issue 4 November 1959 Article 11 
1959 
Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases , 24 MO. L. REV. (1959) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recent Cases
CONFLICT OF LAWS-THE APPLICATION OF STATE LAWS AS
TO IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF WHOLESOMENESS OF
CIGARETTES IN A FEDERAL COURT UNDER
THE ERIE DOCTRINE
Ross v. Philip Morris Co.1
Plaintiff in his complaint against Philip Morris Company claimed damages for
personal injuries resulting from breach of implied warranty of fitness for the
purpose of human consumption. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's cigarettes when
smoked and consumed were not wholesome and fit, but were dangerous and unsafe,
and that defendant, because of its special skill and superior knowledge knew of such
fact but this was not known to the plaintiff. On defendant's motion for summary
judgment, held, motion granted. Since jurisdiction was based upon diversity of
citizenship, the court, pursuant to the doctrine established in Erie R.R. Co. 0.
Tompkins,2 sought out and determined the applicable Missouri law. What would a
Missouri state court hold in this or a similar case?
Plaintiff had sought to bring his case within the "food and drink" cases in which
Missouri intermediate appellate courts have permitted recovery on the theory of
breach of implied warranty.3 Plaintiff contended that the "food and drink" cases:
... set forth a well recognized and firmly entrenched Missouri doctrine
with regard to products manufactured and sold for human consumption, and
show that the ultimate purchase-consumer can recover against a manufac-
turer of products on the theory of breach of implied warranty of wholesome-
ness and fitness... .4
1. 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
2. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938): "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no
federal general common law...."
3. Citing: Williams v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W2d 53 (St. L. Ct. App.
1955); Foley v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948); Norman
v. Jefferson City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 211 S.W.2d 552 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Holy-
field v. Joplin Coca Cola Bottling Co., 170 S.W.2d 451 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943); Helms v.
General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Carter v. St. Louis
Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Ct. App. 1940); Hutchison v. Moerschel Prods.
Co., 234 Mo. App. 518, 133 S.W.2d 701 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939); McNicholas v. Continental
Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Nemela v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
104 S.W.2d 773 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937); Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
4. 164 F. Supp. at 691.
(554)
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However, the court was not persuaded that such was the progression to be given to
Missouri law. The court pointed out that it had previously examined and surveyed
the right of action for breach of implied warranty in Missouri in McIntyre v. Kansas
City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5 and did not see that the law had changed since that
case:
The only difference between the situation considered in the McIntyre
case, supra, and the case at bar is that plaintiff here undertakes to bring
cigarettes within the food and drink cases, supra. As to this, we only say
that if a lady's blouse containing a deleterious dye, injurious to health, is not
a particular object that is the subject matter of a contract, as to which the
doctrine of implied warranty is applicable, then plaintiffs attempt to bring
cigarettes within the food and drink cases as distinguished from an object of
ordinary retail sale, is futile .... 6
The lady's blouse referred to by the court was the subject matter of suit in State
ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shai,, 7 which was deemed decisive of Missouri law in the
McIntyre case. In the instant case the court was again conviced by the Sha case
and by Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of PhiladelphiaS decided a short time later, that the
controlling law of Missouri precluded plaintiffs recovery on the theory of breach of
implied warranty. Bringing his case within the "food and drink" cases would not aid
the plaintiff the court said; because, under the view expressed by the Supreme
Court in the Shai, case recovery would not be permitted in those cases.9
Since Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, a federal court in a diversity of citizenship case
must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits as established by the
state's highest court. Whatever doubt may have at one time existed, it is now well
decided that a federal court in such a case also must follow the decisions of the state's
intermediate appellate courts in the absence of persuasive data that the state's highest
court would reach a contrary decision.10 After recognizing that the courts of appeals
have permitted remote vendees to recover again t the manufacturer in food and drink
cases on the theory of breach of implied warranty, the court became convinced by
the Shai. case that the supreme court would not follow the courts of appeals and
that their decisions did not represent the law of MissourL The court did not seem so
assured in the McIntyre case that the Shain case was to be given that effect, indicat-
5. 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
6. 164 F. Supp. at 691.
7. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944) (en banc).
8. 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
9. The basis of decision in the Shai, case was that the wearing of the blouse
was an "ordinary use;" thus, it was sold for a general purpose, not a particular
purpose. Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court of
Missouri, 10 Mo. L. Ray. 147, 189 (1945), reached the same conclusion from the Shain
case as the court did here: "If the opinion of the court in the instant case is to be read
in the same literal fashion in which the authorities cited by the court were by it
read, all of the case law built by the Courts of Appeal in the food and drink cases
will fall, because of the fact that food sold for immediate consumption is adapted to,
and sold for a general, and not a particular, purpose ......
10. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist., 311 U.S.
180 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
19591
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Ing that the question might still be undecided. 1' Nor have the courts of appeals taken
the Shain case as an answer to the question of whether or not the supreme court
would sustain the position they have taken in the "food and drink" cases. Although
the Shain case has been cited in at least one case involving a breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose decided by a court of appeal,12 in "food
and drink" cases it has not been mentioned and recovery has been permitted as
before.' 3 In fact, it appears that in one instance there has been an extension beyond
the "food and drink" cases. 14 Thus it does not appear that the Shai, case has been
deemed determinative of Missouri law in this area by the courts of appeal. A case
can, of course, lose its persuasive effect without being expressly overruled.15 That,
11. McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 5, at 713-14:
"[I]n the only decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in which implied warranty
in that class of litigation [food and drink] has been dealt with, that Court gave no
expression of its mind so far as liability under the doctrine was concerned, but con-
tended [sic] itself to dispose of the case on a question of sufficiency of proof. See
Stewart v. Martin, 353 Mo. 1, 181 S.W.2d 657. Rightfully, the query is made, in light of
the application of the doctrine in State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, supra, and
Zesch v. Abrasive Co. v. [sic] Philadelphia, supra, whether 'the failure, or refusal, of
the Court, to state what it thought the law on this point should be, has ... a rather
ominous meaning;' and that the action of the Court there taken can be interpreted 'as
indicating that it may, in the future, strike down the courts of appeals' authorities on
(the) point' See Overstreet, supra, loc. cit. p. 164.. .."
12. Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
13. Williams v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955);
Atkinson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Poplar Bluff, 275 S.W.2d 41 (Spr. Ct. App.
1955); Leatherman v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 254 S.W.2d 436 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953);
Strawn v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Missouri, 234 S.W.2d 223 (K.C. Ct App. 1950);
Duley v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 232 S.W.2d 801 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950);
Foley v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948); Norman v.
Jefferson City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 211 S.W.2d 552 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948).
14. Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mig. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1952). A right of recovery by a remote vendee against a manufacturer
on breach of warranty theory was recognized where use of a detergent resulted In
skin injury. However, it should be noted that it is not clear whether the theory
proceeded upon was express or implied warranty.
15. In Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957) the United States district court for the District of Rhode
Island made a determination of the local law of Mississippi on the question of the
ordinary negligence tort liability of a manufacturer to a plaintiff in the absence of
privity. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Ford Motor
Co. v. Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928), holding against such liability, the district
court "reluctantly" concluded that it was bound to apply Mississippi law as declared
in the Ford case, and entered an order dismissing the complaint. The court of appeals,
vacated the order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi in the more recent case of El. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 221 Miss.
378, 73 So. 2d 249 (1954) had in dictum recognized and spoken approvingly of the
modem trend, represented by Carter v. Yardiey & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693
(1946), toward holding the remote manufacturer liable despite the absence of privity.
The court of appeals concluded that the Ford case was no longer controlling, saying at
page 909:
[I]t is not necessary that a case be explicitly overruled in order to lose its
persuasive force as an indication of what the law is. A decision may become
so overloaded with illogical exceptions that by erosion of time it may lose its
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however, does not seem to be the explanation here. It would seem rather that the
courts of appeal were never persuaded in the first place that the Shain case was any
more than an expression or interpretation of the general rule, and that it had no
binding effect upon the exception they have formulated in the "food and drink"
cases. It seems, in those courts, if cigarettes were found to be sufficiently analogous
to "food and drink" to come within that line of cases, the Shain case would not be
deemed controlling. Probably a different result would be reached in our state
courts than has been reached in this case.
The underlying theory of the Erie doctrine is that it should make no difference
in result whether a case is brought in a state court or in a United States court sitting
in that state.16 It is submitted that United States courts in determining the law of
the state in which they sit might reach a result more consistent with that doctrine by
evaluating a decision of the state's highest court in light of the application and effect
the decision is given by the state's intermediate appellate courts.1 7
JoHN E. BuRsuss, JR.
FEE SPLITTING---"FINDER'S FEE"-EFFECT OF MISSOURI
SUPREME COURT RULE 4.34
McFarland v. George1
Defendant had been allowed a substantial fee by a probate court for legal
services rendered in a will contest. Plaintiff brought an action to effect division
But see Polk County, Georgia v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1959).
Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring).
16. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 180 (1940): "It is inadmissible
that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the state courts and another
rule for litigants who bring the same question before the federal courts owing to the
circumstance of diversity of citizenship... ." Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949), Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
17. After this note was completed, and, of course, after the decision was
handed down in the instant case the Supreme Court of Missouri in Midwest Game Co.
v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959) gave what would appear to be the
strongest indication to date of its thinking on the food and drink cases. In that case
plaintiff brought suit for breach of implied warranty of fitness, among other
theories, seeking damages for the loss of its fish which died because defendant's fish
food allegedly was "incomplete" when there was a custom in the trade to manufacture
and sell such food as a complete formula. The court said at page 550:
It is an established rule that in a sale of food for immediate human con-
sumption there is generally an implied warranty that the food is wholesome,
is fit for the purpose, and is of merchantable quality. And a buyer of pack-
aged food products may recover from the manufacturer upon an implied
warranty of fitness even though there is no express privity of contract
between the manufacturer and buyer. Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., Mo.
App., 139 S.W.2d 1025.
1. 316 S.W.2d 662 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
1959]
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of the fee, alleging that defendant and he had been either special partners or joint
adventurers for the duration of the will contest, and demanding one-half of the fee
awarded defendant. The evidence indicated that plaintiff had merely forwarded or
referred the will contest client to defendant, but had neither actively participated in
the handling of the case nor assumed any responsibility therefor.2 The trial court
found for the plaintiff, and awarded judgment in the amount of one-third of the
fee.3 On appeal, reversed, the court of appeals holding that plaintiff was not entitled
to a division of fees, regardless of the nature of the action, when such division would
be violative of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4.34.4
There has long been a custom 5 among attorneys6 whereby the forwarding or
referring attorney receives one-third of the fee received by the attorney who actually
performs the service or assumes the responsibility of handling the case, said one-third
being paid merely for the recommendation.7 The custom is still prevalent,8 and, in
many jurisdictions, is apparently considered neither unethical nor unlawful.9 It
apparently is so common as to be admissible as evidence of an obligation owing to
the forwarder,' 0 or even sufficient to support an action.11
Canon 3412 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics was
formulated, inter alia, to eliminate this custom.' s Canon 34 has repeatedly been con-
strued as intended to prevent a division of fees with an attorney who merely
recommends or forwards. 14 The Missouri supreme court adopted Canon 34 as its
rule 4.34,15 and has adopted a consistent construction in holding, apparently, that
either attorney may be subjected to the court's inherent power to discipline attorneys
2. Id. at 669. Plaintiff had described himself as "'the procuring and referring
lawyer.'"
3. Id. at 670. The amount, said the court, indicated that the trial court relied
on the custom of a finder's fee.
4. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4.34 reads: "No division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
5. Parker v. Gartside, 178 IMI. App. 634 (1913).
6. A layman has no "customary" right to a forwarding fee. Abramson v. Sper-
ling, 162 Misc. 813, 815, 295 N.Y. Supp. 165, 167 (1st Dep't 1937).
7. DRuIK, LEG;AL Exmcs 186 (1953). For cases involving division where
service or responsibility has been shared, see Annot., 10 A.L.R. 1357 (1921).
8. A recent survey indicated that the forwarding fee is common practice. Mc-
Cracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA.
L. REV. 399, 415 (1951).
9. Ibid. The custom is considered unethical in only seven of twenty-five states
reporting.
10. Parker v. Gartside, supra note 5.
11. Turner v. Donovan, 3 Cal. App. 2d 485, 39 P.2d 858 (1935).
12. As last amended, 62 A.B.A. REP. 767 (1937).
13. Ava Ic x BAR AssocirOAno, OPINoNs OF THE COausrTTE ON PROFESSIONAL
ETmIcs ANrD GREvANcEs 204 (1957).
14. Id. at 97, 153, 204, 265. But see app. A. at 353 (if client specifically agrees
to such a division, no objection under Canon 34).
15. 342 Mo. vii, xiii (1937); 352 Mo. xxxi, xxxvi (1944). See rule quoted supra
note 4.
5
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for a division of fees without a division of service or responsibility.16 That a division
of fees in the principal case would have been unethical would seem clear.7
In the McFarLnd case, however, rule 4.34 has apparently been applied as sub-
stantive law. The court has seemingly held that an obligation will be unenforceable
by an attorney when enforcement would necessitate violation of rule 4.34, even where
the practice is not unlawful apart from the rule,18 and that 4n attorney may defend,
against another attorney, on the ground that performance would be violative of the
rule.
The supreme court has construed its rules as having the force and effect of a
judicial decision of that court.19 That the various prohibitions of rule 4.34 may be
applied as substantive law would seem to folow, 20 but only to controversies between
attorneys,21 That performance would involve breach of the rule would probably not
be, per se, an effective defense in an action by a layman.22
Although Canon 34 has been adopted in nearly all jurisdictions, several methods
of adoption have been utilized,23 with the apparent result of a variance of legal effect.
In the states adopting the Canon by legislative enactment, a decision consistent with
the McFarland case would probably be reached.24 Some of the courts adopting the
canon by supreme court rule would, however, apparently deny it the effect of sub-
stantive law.25 In the jurisdictions in which Canon 34 is a voluntarily assumed
standard, the courts might well recognize the canon, and apply it to reach a result
consistent with the principal case.26 Some of the latter jurisdictions purport to
16. In re Ellis, 359 Mo. 231, 221 S.W.2d 139 (1949) (en banc).
17. Custom would not excuse an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. State v.
Meldrum, 243 Iowa 777, 781, 51 N.W.2d 881, 882 (1952); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528,
545, 97 A.2d 621, 630 (1954). See generally 52 COLum. L. REv. 1039 (1952).
18. Compare § 484.150, RSMo 1949 (fee-splitting with a layman a misdemeanor);
see State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 38 N.W.2d 679 (1949).
19. In re Ellis, supra note 16; State v. Shain, 343 Mo. 542, 122 S.W.2d 882 (1938)
(en banc).
20. D)RINm, op. cit. supra note 7, at 27, n25; PHuLs & McCoy, CoNDucT or
JUDGES AND LAw ERs 14 (1952).
21. DRnm , op. cit. supra note 7, at 30; see Reilly v. Beekman, 24 F.2d 791
(2d Cir. 1928). On the effect and validity of contracts between attorneys and lay-
men to divide legal fees, see Annot., 86 A.L.R. 195 (1933).
22. Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1955); Irwin v. Curie,
171 N.Y. 409, 64 N.E. 161 (1902).
23. For a recent compilation, see BAND, BAR AsSOcIATIONs, ATToRrNs AxW
JUDGES-ORGANIZATION, ETncs, DiscIp E 843-45 (1956). The majority of states, in-
cluding Missouri, have integrated state bar associations. i.e., every attorney is re-
quired, either by statute or current rule, to maintain membership in order to practice
law. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 7; DRINKm, LEGAL ETmIcs 20, 21 (1953).
24. See authorities cited supra note 20.
25. Deupree v. Garnett, 277 P.2d 168 (Okla. 1954); In re Hearings Concerning
Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465, 472 (Colo. 1956). Contra, In re Rothman, supra note 17, at 535,
97 A.2d at 625; Ryan v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 593, 599, 295 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1956).
26. See Silver v. Paulson, 285 App. Div. 1059, 139 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1955);
Clark v. Robinson, 252 App. Div. 857, 299 N.Y. Supp. 474 (2d Dep't 1937); In re
Neuman, 169 App. Div. 638, 155 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't 1915); In re Annunziato's
Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
1959]
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1959], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol24/iss4/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
distinguish between the effect of a canon as a disciplinary standard and as sub-
stantive law.
2 7
The result of the McFarland case would seem desirable. There would appear to
be little justification for judicial sanction of such a custom, when it will necessarily
result either in an overcharge to the client or in inadequate compensation to the
forwardee. Quaere whether a payment to one who merely forwards might not be, in
effect, a reward for solicitation? 28
A. H. LAFoncE II
HEIRS AT LAW-EFFECT OF STATUTORY CHANGES
IN DEFINITION
Thomas v. Higginbotham'
The problem of the effect of a statutory change in the meaning of the term
"heirs at law" (other than the simple case of direct devolution) arose for the first
time in Missouri in connection with a devise which became effective in possession at
the termination of an intermediate life estate. The father of Robert and Charles
devised a one-half interest in all his real estate to each of them for life, and at the
death of either, the estate was to vest absolutely in his [the son's] child or children,
but should one son die without issue, the estate was to pass to the surviving brother
for life and was at his death to vest absolutely in his heirs at law. The father died in
1905, and Robert died in 1935 without issue, the estate going to his brother Charles
for life under the provisions of the will. Charles died in 1956 leaving a widow (the
defendant) and two children (the plaintiffs). At the time the father died the term
"heirs at law" did not include the spouse of either son,2 but when Charles died in
1956 and the remaindermen could be determined, the widow of Charles claimed
a share as an "heir at law," within the meaning of that term under the new probate
code.3 She only claimed a share in the estate received by her husband from Robert
in 1935, since the estate granted directly to Charles expressly gave the children a
remainder and excluded any right she might claim in that estate. Charles' children
brought this action to quiet and determine title to the whole estate and the widow
27. Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 302, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (1924). Cf. Tokash v.
State, 232 Ind. 668, 115 N.E.2d 745 (1953); Mullen v. Stoffield, 272 Wis. 402, 75 N.W.2d
460 (1956).
28. See Mo. Su'. CT. R. 4.28 ( ir... eputable ... to pay or reward, directly
or indirectly, those who... influence the bringing of such cases to his office .... t").
1. 318 S.W.2d 234 (Mo. 1958).
2. Before the 1956 probate code the wife or husband of the deceased shared in
the estate only, if there were no children, or their descendants, or father, mother,
brother or sister, or their descendants. § 1, at 518, GS 1866.
3. Under the 1956 probate code the wife or husband of the deceased takes one-
half of the intestate's estate if the deceased is survived by issue, father, mother,
brother or sister or their descendants, but all of the estate if the decedent is not
survived by issue, father, mother, brother or sister. § 474.010, RSMo 1957 Supp.
[Vol. 24
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brought a cross action to quiet and determine title in one-fourth of the estate. The
trial court granted Charles' widow a fourth of the estate. On appeal held: affirmed.
The statutory definition of "heirs at law" at the time of the life tenant's death was
controlling, and not the definition at the time the will was written or at the testator's
death.
The plaintiffs contended that the general plan of the will demonstrated that the
testator desired the land to go to his own descendants. The court dismissed this
contention, pointing out that the testator did not provide that the remainder should go
to his own heirs, but instead, to the life tenant's heirs.4 Also, the testator expressly
provided that a portion of his estate should go to the sons' children and on certain
conditions a portion of his estate should go to sons' heirs. The distinction in the use
of the terms convinced the court that the testator used the term "heirs" in a technical
sense, meaning those individuals who would inherit the property in dispute if the
owner or life tenant died intestate, and did not limit it to the life tenants' issue.5
The testator could have used such terms as children, descendants, issue, or words of a
similar nature to express an intention that the estate should go to his descendants but
he did not do this.
The question brought up for the first time in Missouri in this case is: which
statutory meaning of the term "heirs at law" should control when there is a change
in the statute made between the testator's death and the termination of the inter-
mediate estate? The Missouri supreme court decided that the weight of authority
elsewhere favors the view that the statutory definition in effect at the death of the
life tenant should control.6
Various reasons have been expressed by the courts in other jurisdictions for
adopting the statutory definition of terms in effect at the time of the life beneficiary's
death. Probably the most logical reason is that the gift to the heirs of a living
person necessarily refers to a future time when the heirs first come into existence or
can be determined. To apply the repealed statutory definition of an earlier time to a
situation occuring many years later would certainly be unusual. 7 The testator is also
presumed to know the legal effect of his language and that the legislature can
change the meaning of general terms which depend upon a statute for their mean-
4. If the will had provided that the testator's own heirs should take in the event
of failure of issue, the class would be determined under the statute in effect at the
time of the testator's death. The testator would be the designated ancestor of the
class REsTATm=ET, PRoPERTv § 308 (1940).
5. Gillilan v. Gillilan, 278 Mo. 99, 114, 212 S.W. 348, 351 (1919) (en banc). "We
do not question the rule that the terms 'children' and 'heirs' may be construed to
have been used the one for the other whenever such a construction is necessary to
carry out the dominant thought of the testator as shown by the language employed in
his will." The court said this case was not decisive because there was no language
used in the will showing an intention that the terms were used interchangeably.
6. The court relied upon Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1107, 1112 (1942).
7. Albright v. Van Voorhis, 104 AtI. 27 (N.J. Ch. 1918); Ohio Nat'l Bank v.
Bright, 38 N.E.2d 76 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
1959]
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ing.8 A few courts have reached contrary results by evaluating all the circumstances
under which the will was made in an effort to find the true intent of the testator. A
New York court said, "The intention of the testator is to be construed in the light
of the statute and the decisions applicable at the time he [the testator] wrote his will
and codiils." 9 In these cases the language of the will was clear enough to convince
the court that the testator intended the will to be construed in the light of the
then existing law.' 0
The limitation as actually drawn provided for cross remainders under certain
conditions, but did not do this effectively and an anomalous situation might have
arisen. Thus, if the first son to die is not survived by children to take his half by
way of remainder, the half goes by way of cross remainder to the other brother for
life, with remainder to his heirs at law. Thus a widow of the first son to die would
take nothing. Thereafter, if the second son dies not survived by issue, his widow
takes the w1~ole as an heir at law of such son. Thus, with two childless marriages,
one daughter-in-law is completely excluded and the other daughter-in-law takes
the whole. This is an anomalous situation the testator certainly would not have
intended. The construction of "heirs" as adopted in the principal cases does not
resolve this problem and correct the deficiencies of the original limitation, but a
construction that "heirs" means "children" or "issue" would have made a much
more reasonable distribution of the property in this situation, leaving a reversion in
the testator which would descend equally to the two daughters-in-law. This
problem, was not considered or discussed by the court.
JuLrus F. W=L
INDIANS-CIVIL ACTIONS--JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS
William v. Lee'
Plaintiff, a non-Indian merchant operating a store on the Navajo Indian Reser-
vation in Arizona under a license required by federal statute,2 brought an action
in an Arizona state court against a Navajo Indian and his wife, who resided on the
reservation, to collect for goods sold to them on credit. Defendants' motion to dismiss
8. Sherburne v. Howland, 239 Mass. 439, 132 N.E. 188 (1921); Holmes v.
Alexander, 82 N.H. 380, 134 Atl. 536 (1926); Ohio Nat'l Bank v. Bright, 38 NE2d 76
(Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
9. In re Gould's Estate, 172 Misc. 396, 403, 15 N.Y.S.2d 392, 400 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
Accord, Houghton v. Hughes, 108 Me. 233, 79 Ati. 909 (1911).
10. 1 PAGE, WIUiS § 31 (3d ed. 1941).
Whether or not testator means that the beneficiaries, classes, or property in-
terests, shall be determined by the law in force when the will is made, by the
law in force when testator dies, or by the law in force when the beneficiary is fixed,
or the property interest vests, is a question of testator's intention to be deduced
from the language of the will, when read in the light of the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
1. 358 U.S.217 (1959).
2. 31 Stat. 1066 (1901), as amended, 32 Stat. 1009 (1903), 25 U.S.C. § 262 (1953).
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on the ground that jurisdiction lay in the tribal court rather than in the state court
was overruled; judgment was entered for the plaintiff and affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Arizona. 3 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and
reversed the decision. The Court began by stating that the United States has com-
plete power over the whole intercourse between this nation and the Indians.4 This
power has been held to emanate from the "commerce clause" of the federal constitu-
tion 5 and the recognized relation of tribal Indians to the federal government.6
Pursuant to this rule, where a crime is committed in "Indian country" by or against
an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred by Congress has remained
exclusive. 7 Thus federal courts have jurisdiction to convict white men for crimes
against Indians committed on Indian reservations.3 The federal jurisdiction even
extends to small tracts of land allotted in severalty to named Indians and held for
them in trust by the United States,9 such a situation having been described as giving
3. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
4. Citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This famous case
and its forerunner, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) were an
early episode in the struggle for power between the states and the federal govern-
ment Worcester, a Vermont citizen, was authorized by the United States as a mis-
sionary to the Cherokee Indians on their reservation in Georgia, pursuant to a series
of treaties executed by the United States and the Cherokees. He was arrested by
Georgia and sentenced to four years at hard labor for violation of a Georgia statute
prohibiting white presons from residing within the limits of the Cherokee Nation
without a Georgia permit. In face of widespread doubt that a decision nullifying
the state statute would be enforced by President Jackson, Chief Justice Marshall
boldy held Georgia's attempted assertion of power invalid. For an account of this
near-crisis see 2 WAmiEN, THE Surraz Couar iN UNrrED STATES HISToaY 189-239
(1923).
5. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes." Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Ex aerte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912);
United State v. Holiday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866); Worcester v. Georgia, supra
note 4.
6. Perrin v. United States, supra note 5; United States v. Sandoval, supra note
5; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
supra note 4, at 17, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall described this relationship as re-
sembling "that of a ward to his guardian:'
7. Congress has granted to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over crim-
inal offenses committed in "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1953). However, fed-
eral jurisdiction is expressly precluded by Congress where the offense is committed
by one Indian against another Indian or his property, or where the offense is com-
mitted by an Indian in the Indian country and he is punished by the local law of the
tribe. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1953). For a definition of "Indian country" see 18 TU.S.C.
§ 1151 (1953). Since federal courts have only such jurisdiction as Congress gives
them by statute, 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 308 (1943), it is essential that criminal
jurisdiction over Indian country be expressly conferred. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1953) enum-
erates ten specific crimes for which the federal courts can assess punishment.
8. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
9. Under the provisions of 24 Stat. 388 (1887) and 26 Stat. 794 (1891), Indians
living on certain areas of a reservation which were to be restored to the public
domain were permitted to select eighty acres therein to be alloted to them in sev-
eralty, title thereto to be held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the
allotees and twenty-five years thereafter conveyed to them absolutely. In United
States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914) the Supreme Court decided that such a tract
was "Indian county" within the meaning of the federal statutes and that a federal
10
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rise to "government in spots."10 However the power of the federal government
expires at the perimeter of the "Indian country" and when an Indian ventures outside
his sanctuary he is amenable to the criminal laws of the state wherein he finds
himself."1
As to civil jurisdiction over Indians, one would assume that the same rule should
apply as governs criminal jurisdiction, i.e., that in regard to suits against Indians on
reservations, jurisdiction exist solely by virtue of congressional grant. This is the
view expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case under con-
sideration. However it should be noted, in fairness, that the Arizona courts were not
without support in their determination that they could entertain the suit in question.' 2
The Supreme Court of the United States supported its denial of jurisdiction to the
Arizona courts in this case by asserting that Congress has pursued a policy
"calculated eventually to make all Indians full-fledged participants in American
society."' 3 Under such a plan criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians is granted
to individual states as they become willing and competent to assume the burdens
attendant to such jurisdiction.14 That eventual state jurisdiction over Indians is the
district court had jurisdiction to convict a white man for the murder of an Indian
thereon. The federal government's policy of alloting lands to the Indians in severalty
was described by Mr. Justice Brewer in In the Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499
(1905) to be one ". . . which looks to the breaking up of tribal relations, the estab-
lishing of the separate Indians into individual homes, free from national guardian-
ship and charged with all the rights and obligations of citizens of the United States."
10. Ailshie, J., in State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 660, 123 Pac. 491, 496 (1912). A
jurisdictional maze arises when these Indian tracts become interspersed with white
homesteads. For a general survey of "Indian problems" see Brown, The Indian Prob-
lem and the Law, 39 YALE L.J. 307 (1930).
11. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); State v. Youpee, 103 Mont. 86,
61 P.2d 832 (1936); State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 1026 (1899); State
v. Johnny, 29 Nev. 203, 87 Pac. 3 (1906); People ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 215 N.Y.
42, 109 N.E. 116 (1915).
12. Bates v. Printup, 31 Misc. 17, 64 N.Y. Supp. 561 (County Ct. 1900); Stacy
v. La Belle, 99 Wis. 520, 75 N.W. 60 (1898); 42 C.J.S. Indians § 8(b) (1944).
13. 358 U.S. at 220.
14. 62 Stat. 1224 (1948), 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1953) grants to the State of New
York ".... jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian res-
ervati6ns within the State of New York... ;" 64 Stat. 845 (1950), 25 U.S.C. § 233
(1953) makes an identical grant of civil jurisdiction to New York. 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(Supp. V, 1958) grants jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians
on enumerated areas of the Indian country in the named states, to the states of
Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(Supp. V, 1958) grants civil jurisdiction over causes between Indians or to which
Indians are parties, which arise on the same enumerated areas of the Indian country,
to the same group of states. The reasons behind the latter two statutes are briefly
set out in H.R. Rep. No. 848, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), published in 2 U.S. COnE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2409-14 (1953). It seemed to be the opinion of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, based on findings of its Indian Affairs Subcommittee,
that H.R. 1063, which became 18 U.S.C. § 1162, supra, would facilitate a more uniform
enforcement of criminal laws on the Indian reservations since, prior to the granting
of state jurisdiction, federal courts alone could act in regard to such offenses, and
the federal jurisdiction was limited to ten major crimes set out by Congress. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1953) enumerated the crimes of murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery and
larceny. Thus many offenses on the Indian country were not punishable in any tri-
bunal except the tribal court.
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goal of Congress is evidenced in a general statute enacted in 1953 permitting any state,
under certain conditions, to assume jurisdiction over "Indian country."1 5 The pres-
ence of such a statute indicates that the policy of the United States is one of pro-
hibition of state authority over "Indian country" until qualification of the individual
state to assume it. The Supreme Court asserted that this policy had been applied to
the Navajos, pointing to a treaty signed June 1, 1868, at Fort Sumner in the New
Mexico Territory between General William T. Sherman for the United States and
certain chiefs and headmen of the Navajo tribe.1 6 The Court stated:
Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees
involved in Worcester v. State of Georgia, was the understanding that the
internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of
whatever tribal government existed.' 7
Thus it seems that in addition to relying upon the exclusive power of the United
States over this nation's intercourse with the Indians, the Court sought additional
strength for its decision by drawing upon the above treaty. That the United States
has in the past made countless treaties with the several Indian tribes is a well known
historical fact. The concept of one nation executing a treaty with another group
within the formers sovereign territorial limits may seem a bit incongruous,' 8 yet
15. Act of Aug. 15, 1953 §§ 6-7, 67 Stat. 588, 590, provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a
State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any
State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes,
as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of
civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with re-
spect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people
thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as
the case may be .... The consent of the United States is hereby given to
any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act,
to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of
the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State
to assumption thereof.
Arizona has an express disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands in its en-
abling act, 36 Stat. 569 (1910), and in its constitution, APmz. CONST., art. 20(4).
16. 15 Stat. 667 (1868). In 16 Stat. 566 (1871), 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1953) Congress
declared that no Indian tribe or nation within the United States should thereafter
be recognized as an independent power with whom the United States could execute
a treaty, but provided that this should not impair the obligations of any treaty pre-
viously ratified. Thus the 1868 treaty with the Nav'ajos is still existing and valid.
17. 358 U.S. at 221-22.
18. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), it was decided
that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" within the meaning of U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2; therefore it could not sue on that basis in the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Court also asserted that the Cherokees were not a State of
the Union. But the Court added that this nation had recognized the Cherokees as
"a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible
in their political character for any violation of their engagements . . ." 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) at 16. As previously pointed out in note 16, supra, this nation abandoned the
concept that the Indian tribes were sovereign powers in 1871.
1959]
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from the beginning this nation has considered Indian tribes to be proper parties
to execute treaties with the United States.19
That the Indian Territory composed a part of the United States was asserted as
early as 1831.20 This raises another question: If the Indians were, on the one hand, an
independent power with whom this nation could execute treaties and, on the other
hand, a part of the United States insofar as foreign nations were concerned, who
owned the land which the Indians occupied? The concept of a landlord-tenant
relationship between two sovereign powers is certainly unique. Yet in Johnnon v.
M'Intosh 21 the Supreme Court of the United States early decided that "Indian title"
to land was a right of occupancy only, with the ultimate fee in the sovereign. This
doctrine was asserted at a time when the sovereign landlord was having substantial
difficulty evicting its Indian tenants in numerous instances.22
With the Supreme Court here deciding that the action against the reservation
Indian could not be maintained in the Arizona state courts the plaintiff is likely to
inquire as to where he should go to collect his debt. Should he be sent to the federal
district court? Will he be able to invoke federal jurisdiction on the ground of
diversity of citizenship? 23 Historically Indians were not considered citizens of the
United States or of the state wherein they resided.2 4 Thus the action here would not
19. At least until 1871; see note 16 supra.
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra note 18, at 16-17. The Court stated
that the Indians and the land they occupied were considered "so completely under
the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their
lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility."
21. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). In this case Chief Justice Marshall reviewed
the fundamental principles upon which land titles in the new world were based,
saying that by agreement among the European countries, discovery gave title to the
government by whose authority it was made, subject to the Indian right of occupancy.
For a detailed analysis of ownership of Indian lands in the several states see 3
A.mucAN LAW OF Paopmrry §§ 12.16-12.23 (Casner ed. 1952).
22. The Removal Act of May 28, 1830, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) authorized the presi-
dent to negotiate with the Indian tribes east of the Mississippi River on a basis
of payment for their lands and improvements and a grant of land west of the Mis-
sissippi, to which perpetual title would be secured. While this act was not in itself
coercive it was enforced by military action wherever resistance was met. A later
era beginning about 1850 was marked by frequent raids and skirmishes up and
down the great western plains, culminating with the capture and imprisonment of
Geronimo in 1887 and the death of Sitting Bull in 1890. 12 ENCYCLOPAEDrA BnrrANNICA
Indians, North American 208 (1958).
23. 28 U.S.C. App. § 1332 (Supp. IV, 1957) gives federal district courts juris-
diction over civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between (1) citizens of different states; (2) citizens of
a state, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) citizens of different
states and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional
parties.
24. Under U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, "All persons born ... in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside." In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) it was held
that Indians did not come within the purview of this sectiion because they were not
completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
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be one between "citizens" of different states. And if Indian tribes are "domestic
dependent nations"2 5 the action would not be one involving citizens of a foreign
state. By act of Congress in 195226 all Indians now born in the United States are
citizens of this nation at birth. While presumably this statute does not apply to the
defendant Lee in this case, it may in the future remove the "citizenship" incapacity
in this type of case. Yet the problem remains as to whether or not the Indian
becomes at birth a citizen of the state wherein he is born, or of any state at all.
27
As to this the 1952 act is silent. Since this act seemingly does not enter into this
case the question of state citizenship of Indians born in the United States need not
here be speculated upon.
With diversity of citizenship discarded in this case it is difficult to see any other
basis for federal jurisdiction. Thus one is led to the conclusion that the only tribunal
in which the plaintiff can seek redress is the tribal court. This seems to be what the
Supreme Court had in mind. The Court pointed out that today the Navajo Courts of
Indian Offenses exercise broad criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by
outsiders against Indian defendants.28 Perhaps the decision here will encourage
states such as Arizona to attempt to secure jurisdiction over reservation Indians
under the provisions of the 1953 act.2 9
JoMa CHARLES CROW
RIGHT OF PRIVACY-UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PHOTOGRAPH
Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co.1
A photograph of the plaintiff, taken while she wag in a state of shock and grief,
was later used without her consent or knowledge to illustrate a fictional article in
defendant's magazine, Inside Detective. 2 The trial court sustained defendant's motion
to strike the complaint for invasion of privacy on the ground the story was of a
newsworthy occurrence. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. The Illinois
25. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nition v. Georgia supra, note 18,
at 17.
26. 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (2) (1953).
27. As pointed out in note 24 supra, the 14th amendment was held not to apply
to tribal Indians. Therefore until the 1952 act of Congress, supra note 26, Indians
were neither citizens of the United States nor of the state wherein they resided. The
1952 act has made all Indians born in the United States citizens of this nation, but
it does not provide for any accompanying state citizenship.
28. 358 U.S. at 222.
29. See statute cited supra note 15.
1. 17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958).
2. The plaintiff was in emotional shock when told her detective-husband had
been shot to death in a gun duel with an escaped felon, one Amadeo. The chain of
events, including Amadeo's initial capture, a girl friend smuggling a gun to him
under her slip, his escape and the gun duel in which plaintiff's husband was killed,
was legitimate news. These occurrences received wide publicity at the time. Plain-
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appellate court, holding the complaint alleged a cause of action, stated that the
article as suggested by its title, "If You Love Me, Slip Me a Gun," was in fact a com-
mercial exploitation of the news story and not subject to the protection afforded
valid news reporting.3
In an earlier case of first impression,4 Illinois joined, as Judge Schwartz said,
"this massive weight of authority"5 recognizing an individual's right of privacy.
There the plaintiffs photograph was used without her permission in an advertisement
by the defendant in promoting the sale of dog food.6 It was stated: "A person may
not make an unauthorized appropriation of the personality of another, especially of
his name or likeness, without being liable to him for mental distress as well as the
actual pecuniary damages which the appropriation causes."'7
The Annerino decision extended the cause of action for invasion of the right of
privacy to include "commercial exploitations" other than for advertising purposes.
Two recent federal court cases in Illinois denied recovery. In one the unau-
thorized use of a photograph of plaintiff's automobile was too blurred to be identi-
fied.8 In the other an unauthorized use of a photograph of plaintiff's son was held not
to invade the privacy of the father;9 there Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, said:
"In our opinion [plaintiff-father] had been catapulated into an area of legitimate
public news interest.' 0 Quaere whether the father of a son, who has become the
subject of a legitimate news spotlight, ipso facto is "catapulted" to that same spot-
light?
3. Although recognizing that the individual's right of privacy may be invaded
by the legitimate dissemination of news or a proper exercise of freedom of the press,
the court observed: "The 'story' impression and fictional value are further heightened
by the subtitle in bold type and sharing near equal prominence on the first page of
the 'account' which reads, 'She lifted her ballerina skirt. "There, honey, fastened to
the garter ... ""'1 17 M. App. 2d at 209, 149 N.E.2d at 763.
4. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 IM. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
5. Id. at 296, 106 N.E.2d at 744.
6. The plaintiff was a blind girl, and the advertising depicted her as a pros-
pective donee of a "Master Eye Dog." Plaintiff alleged that she already had a seeing
eye dog, and as result of the unauthorized use of her photograph in this advertising,
it "caused her to lose the respect and admiration of those who knew her and to suffer
humiliation and mental anguish." Id. at 294, 106 NME.2d at 743.
7. Id. at 299, 106 NE.2d at 745.
8. Branson v. Fawcett Publications, 124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. IM. 1954).
9. Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, 230 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1956). The snapshot
involved showed the plaintiff's son standing before the mantel in the living room.
After his son died from narcotic poisoning, this picture was used by defendant to
illustrate an article entitled "The Fight Against Teen-Age Dope Addiction". The
plaintiff alleged that the use of this picture in conjunction with other pictures of
narcotics and paraphernalia suggested to the reader that they were also in his home,
which was identifiable from the background in the photograph. Apparently the
district court had found the background unidentifiable. The decision indicates that
a father cannot claim invasion of his right of privacy predicated upon an unauthorized
use of his son's photograph. Contra, Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155
S.E. 194 (1930), holding a mother's right of privacy was invaded by defendant's
unauthorized use of a photograph of her deformed child.
10. 230 F.2d at 361.
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In 1890 right of privacy was born. From out of the warp of the legal past,
Samuel D. Warren and Louise D. Brandeisll conceived this invasion as a separate
tort. Its fruition is legal history.
Missouri early recognized such a common law right. In 1911 the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Ellison, held that a five-year-old plaintiff's
right of privacy was invaded by an unauthorized use of his picture in defendant's
advertisement.12 Conceiving this to be in incorporeal property right, the court
continued:
It is spoken of as a new right, when, in fact, it is an old right with a new
name. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, are rights of all men. The
right to life includes the pursuit of happiness.... He may adopt that of
privacy, or, if he likes, of entire seclusion.13
Today it is well recognized that one's right of privacy does not extend to "entire
seclusion." His right of privacy must yield to the public interest in the dissemination
of legitimate news occurrences. One who is thrust into the spotlight will find his
right of privacy proportionally relinquished.14
In Barber v. Time, Inc., the Supreme Court of Missouri,15 in an opinion by Judge
Hyde, recognizing the constitutional right of freedom of the press as well as the right
of the individual to privacy, held that the defendant had abused its constitutional
right.'6 The plaintiff was under treatment in a general hospital for an unusual ailment
which gave her an unique appetite. Illustrating a medical article on her condition,
defendant ran a photograph taken of her in the hospital bed by a third party without
her consent. Editorial comment by Time provided these additional titles and cutlines:
"Starving Glutton," "Insatiable-Eater Barber," and "She eats for ten2' Approving
the Restatement of Torts, the court recognized necessary elements apart from unau-
thorized use.1 7 "[L]iability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he
11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
12. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911).
13. Id. at 659, 134 S.W. at 1078-79.
14. REsTATrnmq, TORTS § 867, comment c at 400 (1939). "[T]hey are subject
to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to
their leaders, heroes, villains and victims."
15. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), 8 Mo. L. Rzv. 74 (1943).
16. "Thus, establishing conditions of liability for invasion of the right of privacy
is a matter of harmonizing individual rights with community and social interests. We
think they can be harmonized on a reasonable basis, recognizing the right of privacy
without abridging freedom of the press .... If the court decides that the matter is
outside the scope of proper public interest and that there is substantial evidence
tending to show a serious, unreasonable, unwarranted and offensive interference with
another's private affairs, then the case is one to be submitted to the jury.... [T]his
rule... only limits its abuse; . . ." Id. at 1206-07, 159 S.W.2d at 295.
17. RESTATnMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939). "A person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or. his like-
ness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
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should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibitles."'s
The court, while admitting the unusual illness to have been legitimate news interest,
determined that the appropriation of plaintiff's personality-name and picture-was
added solely to attract the reader's attention.19
The public may want spice in its news, but the fourth estate may be well advised
to spice with discretion if additional flavor is to be derived from appropriations of
protected private interests. The Annerino case has extended protection of privacy in
Illinois to include this area of "commerical exploitation" as the Barber case extended
it for Missouri. In New York, which has a substantial part of the publishing industry,
the courts allow some "commercial exploitations" which do not constitute "advertis-
ing" or "trade" within the meaning of the New York statute.20
Although Missouri courts have but twice spoken on the issue of photography v.
privacy, this does not indicate any doubt of the right or of its breadth. The Barber
case has served journalistic notice. Two basic questions are posed: (1) the extent of
intrusion upon the individual who is a proper subject of news spotlight; (2) the
extent of intrusion beyond this individual to fortuitously linked non-actors. 21
These questions will become of increased importance if and when the television
camera invades the courtroom. What of the privacy of those at trial but not on trial?
Can it be said that a witness present only because of subpoena has waived all right
of privacy? When the Missouri courts consider the issue of canon 35 of the canons
of judicial ethics,22 the case for privacy should be an integral part of that question.
M. RMDAM VANET
18. Id. comment d. The comment of the restatement continues at 401: "It is only
where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that liability accrues.
These limits are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who has never
manifested a desire to have publicity are exposd to the public, or where photographs
of a person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously taken and published."
19. The court ordered a remittitur of the $1,500 allowed for punitive damages,
and if complied with, affirmed the $1,500 allowed as actual damages. The court held
that the qualified privilege had rebutted the presumption of implied malice and the
plaintiff had failed to prove express malice which was requisite for recovery of
.punitive damages.
20. N.Y. Cs lGH= LAw §§ 50, 51 (1950). Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913); Colyer v. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297,
146 N.Y. Supp. 999 (2d Dep't 1914); Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692,
271 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
21. Metzger v. Dell Publication Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct.
1955). Defendant-publisher in its magazine, Front Page Detective, ran an article
entitled "Gang-Boy," depicting Brooklyn juvenile delinquency. Plaintiff, not a
juvenile delinquent, gave consent to be photographed standing on a street corner.
Defendant's use of this photograph to depict a typical gang scene was held to invade
plaintiff's right of privacy. However, in Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co.,
83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955), plaintiff, while in a cigar store to purchase a newspaper,
found himself amidst a gambling raid where he was questioned by police as a suspect.
The Florida supreme court held the plaintiff's right of privacy was not invaded by
the "on-the-spot" filming and later showing in a television news program.
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